The essence of the problem of the Kuril Islands. Sushi question. Why Russia will never give Japan the South Kuriles. Kuriles - to you, Sakhalin - to us

The problem of the Kuril Islands

group 03 History

The so-called "disputed territories" include the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai (the Lesser Kuril Ridge consists of 8 islands).

Usually, when discussing the problem of disputed territories, three groups of problems are considered: historical parity in the discovery and development of the islands, the role and significance of the Russian-Japanese treaties of the 19th century that established the border between the two countries, and the legal force of all documents regulating the post-war world order. It is especially interesting in this matter that all the historical treaties of the past, to which Japanese politicians refer, have lost their force in today's disputes, not even in 1945, but back in 1904, with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, because international law says: a state of war between states terminates the operation of all and all treaties between them. For this reason alone, the entire “historical” layer of the Japanese side's argument has nothing to do with the rights of today's Japanese state. Therefore, we will not consider the first two problems, but focus on the third.

The very fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. was a gross violation of the Treaty of Shimoda, which proclaimed "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan." After Russia's defeat, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed in 1905. The Japanese side demanded from Russia as an indemnity the island of Sakhalin. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the exchange agreement of 1875, and also stated that all trade agreements between Japan and Russia would be canceled as a result of the war. This annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855. Thus, by the time of the conclusion on January 20, 1925. convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan, in fact, there was no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

The issue of restoring the rights of the USSR to the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was discussed in November 1943. at the Tehran Conference of the Heads of the Allied Powers. at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain finally agreed that after the end of the Second World War, South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands would pass to the Soviet Union, and this was the condition for the USSR to enter the war with Japan - three months after the end of the war in Europe.

February 2, 1946 followed by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which established that all land with its bowels and waters in the territory of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands is state property of the USSR.

On September 8, 1951, 49 states signed a peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco. The draft treaty was prepared during the Cold War without the participation of the USSR and in violation of the principles of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet side proposed to carry out demilitarization and ensure the democratization of the country. The USSR, and with it Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to sign the treaty. However, Article 2 of this treaty states that Japan waives all rights and title to Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. Thus, Japan itself renounced its territorial claims to our country, backing it up with its signature.

But later, the United States began to assert that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not indicate in whose favor Japan renounced these territories. This laid the foundation for the presentation of territorial claims.

1956, Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Soviet side agrees to cede the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan and offers to sign a Joint Declaration. The declaration assumed first the conclusion of a peace treaty and only then the "transfer" of the two islands. The transfer is an act of goodwill, a willingness to dispose of one's own territory "in meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state." Japan, on the other hand, insists that the “return” precede the peace treaty, because the very concept of “return” is the recognition of the illegality of their belonging to the USSR, which is a revision not only of the results of the Second World War, but also the principle of the inviolability of these results. American pressure played its part, and the Japanese refused to sign a peace treaty on our terms. The subsequent security treaty (1960) between the United States and Japan made it impossible for Japan to transfer Shikotan and Habomai. Our country, of course, could not give the islands to American bases, nor could it bind itself to any obligations to Japan on the issue of the Kuriles.

On January 27, 1960, the USSR announced that, since this agreement was directed against the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet government refused to consider the transfer of these islands to Japan, since this would lead to the expansion of the territory used by American troops.

At present, the Japanese side claims that the islands of Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and the Habomai ridge, which have always been Japanese territory, are not included in the Kuril Islands, which Japan abandoned. The US government, regarding the scope of the “Kuril Islands” concept in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, stated in an official document: “They do not include, and there was no intention to include (in the Kuriles) the Khabomai and Shikotan ridges, or Kunashir and Iturup, which previously always were part of Japan proper and therefore should rightly be recognized as being under Japanese sovereignty."

A worthy answer about the territorial claims to us from Japan gave in due time: "The borders between the USSR and Japan should be considered as the result of the Second World War."

In the 90s, at a meeting with the Japanese delegation, he also strongly opposed the revision of borders, while emphasizing that the borders between the USSR and Japan were "legal and legally justified." Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the issue of belonging to the southern group of the Kuril Islands Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Khabomai (in the Japanese interpretation - the issue of the "northern territories") remained the main stumbling block in Japanese-Soviet (later Japanese-Russian) relations.

In 1993, the Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations was signed, which states that Russia is the successor of the USSR and that all agreements signed between the USSR and Japan will be recognized by Russia and Japan.

On November 14, 2004, the head of the Foreign Ministry, on the eve of the president's visit to Japan, announced that Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, recognizes the 1956 Declaration as existing and is ready to conduct territorial negotiations with Japan on its basis. This formulation of the question caused a lively discussion among Russian politicians. Vladimir Putin supported the Foreign Ministry's position, stipulating that Russia "will fulfill all its obligations" only "to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill these agreements." Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi responded by saying that Japan was not satisfied with the transfer of only two islands: "If the ownership of all the islands is not determined, the peace treaty will not be signed." At the same time, the Japanese prime minister promised to show flexibility in determining the timing of the transfer of the islands.

On December 14, 2004, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed his readiness to assist Japan in resolving the dispute with Russia over the South Kuriles. Some observers see this as a US rejection of neutrality in the Japanese-Russian territorial dispute. Yes, and a way to divert attention from their actions at the end of the war, as well as maintain equality of forces in the region.

During the Cold War, the United States supported the position of Japan in the dispute over the South Kuril Islands and did everything to ensure that this position was not softened. It was under pressure from the United States that Japan revised its attitude towards the Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956 and began to demand the return of all disputed territories. But at the beginning of the 21st century, when Moscow and Washington found a common enemy, the US stopped making any statements about the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute.

On August 16, 2006, a Japanese fishing schooner was detained by Russian border guards. The schooner refused to obey the commands of the border guards, warning fire was opened on it. During the incident, one crew member of the schooner was fatally shot in the head. This caused a sharp protest from the Japanese side. Both sides say the incident took place in their own territorial waters. In 50 years of dispute over the islands, this is the first recorded death.

On December 13, 2006, the head of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taro Aso, at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee of the lower house of representatives of the parliament, spoke in favor of dividing the southern part of the disputed Kuril Islands in half with Russia. There is a point of view that in this way the Japanese side hopes to solve a long-standing problem in Russian-Japanese relations. However, immediately after Taro Aso's statement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry disavowed his words, emphasizing that they were misinterpreted.

To be sure, Tokyo's position on Russia has undergone some changes. She abandoned the principle of "inseparability of politics and economics", that is, the rigid linkage of the territorial problem with cooperation in the field of the economy. Now the Japanese government is trying to pursue a flexible policy, which means gently promoting economic cooperation and solving the territorial problem at the same time.

The main factors to be taken into account when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands

· the presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;

· underdevelopment of infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the virtual absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of own vehicles to ensure freight and passenger traffic;

· proximity and practically unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region; the need to preserve the unique natural complex of the Kuril Islands, maintain local energy balance while maintaining the purity of the air and water basins, and protect the unique flora and fauna. When developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands, the opinion of the local civilian population should be taken into account. Those who stay should be guaranteed all rights (including property), and those who leave should be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to accept the change in the status of these territories.

The Kuril Islands are of great geopolitical and military-strategic importance for Russia and affect the national security of Russia. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of the Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. The Kuril Islands and the water area adjacent to them is the only ecosystem of its kind that has the richest natural resources, primarily biological ones. The coastal waters of the South Kuril Islands and the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitats for valuable commercial fish and seafood species, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the economy of the Kuril Islands.

The principle of the inviolability of the results of the Second World War should form the basis of a new stage in Russo-Japanese relations, and the term "return" should be forgotten. But perhaps it is worth letting Japan create a museum of military glory on Kunashir, from which Japanese pilots bombed Pearl Harbor. Let the Japanese more often remember what the Americans did to them in response, and about the US base in Okinawa, but they feel the tribute of the Russians to the former enemy.

Notes:

1. Russia and the problem of the Kuril Islands. Tactics of upholding or surrender strategy. http:///analit/

3. The Kuriles are also Russian land. http:///analit/sobytia/

4. Russia and the problem of the Kuril Islands. Tactics of upholding or surrender strategy. http:///analit/

7. Modern Japanese historians on the development of the South Kuril Islands (beginning of the 17th - beginning of the 19th century) http://proceedings. /

8. The Kuriles are also Russian land. http:///analit/sobytia/

History of the Kuril Islands

Background

Briefly, the history of the "belonging" of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island is as follows.

1.In period 1639-1649. Russian Cossack detachments led by Moskovitinov, Kolobov, Popov explored and began to explore Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. At the same time, Russian pioneers repeatedly swim to the island of Hokkaido, where they are peacefully met by local natives of the Ainu people. The Japanese appeared on this island a century later, after which they exterminated and partially assimilated the Ainu.

2.B 1701 Cossack constable Vladimir Atlasov reported to Peter I about the "subordination" of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Russian crown, leading to the "wonderful Nipon kingdom."

3.B 1786. By order of Catherine II, a register of Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean was produced, bringing the register to the attention of all European states as a declaration of Russia's rights to these possessions, including Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

4.B 1792. By decree of Catherine II, the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as Sakhalin Island officially incorporated into the Russian Empire.

5. As a result of the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War 1854-1855 gg. under pressure England and France Russia forced was concluded with Japan on February 7, 1855. Treaty of Shimoda, through which four southern islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to Japan: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Sakhalin remained undivided between Russia and Japan. At the same time, however, the right of Russian ships to enter Japanese ports was recognized, and "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia" was proclaimed.

6.May 7, 1875 under the Petersburg Treaty, the tsarist government as a very strange act of "good will" makes incomprehensible further territorial concessions to Japan and transfers to it 18 more small islands of the archipelago. In return, Japan finally recognized Russia's right to the whole of Sakhalin. It is for this agreement referred most of all by the Japanese today, slyly silent that the first article of this treaty reads: "... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between Russia and Japan" ( the Japanese themselves violated this treaty in the 20th century repeatedly). Many Russian statesmen of those years sharply condemned this “exchange” treaty as short-sighted and harmful to the future of Russia, comparing it with the same short-sightedness as the sale of Alaska to the United States of America in 1867 for next to nothing (7 billion 200 million dollars). ), saying "now we're biting our own elbows".

7. After the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 gg. followed another stage of humiliation of Russia. By Portsmouth peace treaty concluded on September 5, 1905, Japan received the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, and also took away from Russia the right to lease the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dalniy. When Russian diplomats reminded the Japanese that all these provisions are contrary to the 1875 treaty g., those arrogantly and arrogantly answered : « War cancels all treaties. You have failed and let's proceed from the current situation ". Reader, remember this boastful declaration of the invader!

8. Next comes the time of punishment of the aggressor for his eternal greed and territorial expansion. Signed by Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference February 10, 1945 G. " Agreement on the Far East"It was envisaged:" ... 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan subject to the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, as well as the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny(these built and equipped hands of Russian workers, soldiers and sailors in the late XIX-early XX centuries. geographically very convenient naval bases were donated to "fraternal" China. But these bases were so necessary for our fleet in the 60-80s of the rampant "cold war" and intense combat service of the fleet in remote areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. I had to equip the forward base Cam Ranh in Vietnam for the fleet from scratch).

9.B July 1945 g. in accordance with Potsdam Declaration heads of the victorious countries the following verdict was passed regarding the future of Japan: "The sovereignty of Japan shall be limited to four islands: Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and such as WE SPECIFY". August 14, 1945 the Japanese government has publicly confirmed the acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and on September 2 Japan unconditionally surrendered. Article 6 of the Instrument of Surrender reads: "... the Japanese government and its successors will faithfully fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to give such orders and take such actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers shall require in order to carry out this declaration...”. January 29, 1946 Commander-in-Chief General MacArthur DEMANDED by Directive No. 677: "The Kuril Islands, including Habomai and Shikotan, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Japan." AND only after that of legal action, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 2, 1946 was issued, which stated: "All lands, bowels and waters of Sakhalin and the Kul Islands are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Thus, the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as about. Sakhalin, legally And were returned to Russia in accordance with international law . This could put an end to the "problem" of the Southern Kuriles and stop all further verbiage. But the story of the Kuriles continues.

10. After the end of World War II US occupied Japan and turned it into their military foothold in the Far East. In September 1951 USA, UK and a number of other states (total 49) signed San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, prepared in violation of the Potsdam agreements without the participation of the Soviet Union . Therefore, our government did not join the treaty. However, Art. 2, chapter II of this treaty, it is fixed in black and white: “ Japan renounces all legal grounds and claims ... to the Kuril Islands and that part of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. However, even after this, the story with the Kuriles does not end.

October 11.19 1956 d. the government of the Soviet Union, following the principles of friendship with neighboring states, signed with the Japanese government joint declaration, according to which the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended and peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations were restored between them. When signing the Declaration as a gesture of good will and no more promised to give Japan the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and Habomai, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries.

12. However The United States after 1956 imposed a number of military agreements on Japan, replaced in 1960 by a single "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security", according to which US troops remained on its territory, and thereby the Japanese islands turned into a base of aggression against the Soviet Union. In connection with this situation, the Soviet government announced to Japan that it was impossible to transfer the promised two islands to it.. And in the same statement it was emphasized that according to the declaration of October 19, 1956, "peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations" between the countries were established. Therefore, an additional peace treaty may not be required.
Thus, the problem of the Southern Kuriles does not exist. It's been decided a long time ago. AND de jure and de facto the islands belong to Russia . In this regard, it might be to remind the Japanese of their arrogant statement in 1905 g., and also indicate that Japan was defeated in World War II and therefore has no rights to any territory, even to her ancestral lands, except for those granted to her by the victors.
AND our foreign ministry just as harshly, or in a milder diplomatic form it would be necessary to declare this to the Japanese and put an end to this, FOREVER stopping all negotiations and even conversations on this non-existent and humiliating problem of the dignity and authority of Russia.
And again the "territorial question"

However, starting from 1991 , repeatedly held meetings of the President Yeltsin and members of the Russian government, diplomats with government circles in Japan, during which the Japanese side every time importunately raises the question of the "Northern Japanese Territories".
Thus, in the Tokyo Declaration 1993 signed by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan, was again acknowledged the "existence of the territorial issue", and both sides promised to "make efforts" to resolve it. The question arises - could our diplomats really know that such declarations should not be signed, because the recognition of the existence of a "territorial issue" is contrary to the national interests of Russia (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Treason") ??

As for the peace treaty with Japan, it is de facto and de jure in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956. not really needed. The Japanese do not want to conclude an additional official peace treaty, and there is no need. He Japan needs more, as the side that was defeated in the Second World War, rather than Russia.

A citizens of Russia should know the “problem” of the South Kuriles, sucked from the finger , her exaggeration, periodic media hype around her and the litigation of the Japanese - there is consequence illegal Japan's claims in violation of the obligations it has assumed, to strictly comply with the international obligations recognized and signed by it. And such a constant desire of Japan to reconsider the ownership of many territories in the Asia-Pacific region pervades Japanese politics throughout the 20th century.

Why the Japanese, one might say, have seized the South Kuriles with their teeth and are trying to seize them again illegally? But because the economic and military-strategic importance of this region is extremely great for Japan, and even more so for Russia. This an area of ​​colossal seafood riches(fish, living creatures, marine animals, vegetation, etc.), deposits of minerals, and rare earth minerals, energy sources, mineral raw materials.

For example, January 29 of this year. short information slipped through the Vesti (RTR) program: a a large deposit of the rare earth metal Rhenium(75th element in the periodic table, and the only one in the world ).
Scientists allegedly calculated that it would be enough to invest only 35 thousand dollars, but the profit from the extraction of this metal will allow to bring the whole of Russia out of the crisis in 3-4 years. Apparently, the Japanese know about this and that is why they are so persistently attacking the Russian government with a demand to give them the islands.

It must be said that for 50 years of ownership of the islands, the Japanese have not built or created anything capital on them, except for light temporary buildings. Our border guards had to rebuild barracks and other buildings at the outposts. The entire economic "development" of the islands, which the Japanese are shouting to the whole world today, consisted in the predatory robbery of the riches of the islands . During the Japanese "development" from the islands rookeries of fur seals, habitats of sea otters disappeared . Part of the population of these animals our Kuril residents have already restored .

Today, the economic situation of this entire island zone, like the whole of Russia, is difficult. Of course, significant measures are needed to support this region and take care of the Kuril people. According to the calculations of a group of deputies of the State Duma, it is possible to extract on the islands, as reported in the program "Parliamentary Hour" (RTR) on January 31 of this year, only fish products up to 2000 tons per year, with a net profit of about 3 billion dollars.
In military terms, the ridge of the Northern and Southern Kuriles with Sakhalin constitutes a complete closed infrastructure of the strategic defense of the Far East and the Pacific Fleet. They enclose the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and turn it into an inland one. This is the area deployment and combat positions of our strategic submarines.

Without the South Kuriles, we will get a "hole" in this defense. Control over the Kuriles ensures free access of the fleet to the ocean - after all, until 1945, our Pacific Fleet, starting from 1905, was practically locked in its bases in Primorye. The means of detection on the islands provide long-range detection of air and surface enemy, the organization of anti-submarine defense of the approaches to the passages between the islands.

In conclusion, one should note such a feature in the relationship of the Russia-Japan-US triangle. It is the United States that confirms the "legitimacy" of the ownership of the islands of Japan in spite of all international treaties they have signed .
If so, then our Foreign Ministry has every right, in response to the claims of the Japanese, to offer them to demand the return of Japan of its "southern territories" - the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands.
These archipelagos former colonies of Germany, captured by Japan in 1914. Japan's dominion over these islands was sanctioned by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After the defeat of Japan, all these archipelagos came under US control.. So Why shouldn't Japan demand that the United States return the islands to her? Or lack of spirit?
As you can see, there is explicit double standard in Japanese foreign policy.

And one more fact that clarifies the general picture of the return of our Far Eastern territories in September 1945 and the military significance of this region. The Kuril operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet (August 18 - September 1, 1945) provided for the liberation of all the Kuril Islands and the capture of the island of Hokkaido.

The accession of this island to Russia would be of great operational and strategic importance, since it would ensure the complete isolation of the "fencing" of the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk by our island territories: the Kuriles - Hokkaido - Sakhalin. But Stalin canceled this part of the operation, saying that with the liberation of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, we had resolved all our territorial issues in the Far East. A we don't need foreign land . In addition, the capture of Hokkaido will cost us a lot of blood, unnecessary losses of sailors and paratroopers in the very last days of the war.

Stalin here showed himself to be a real statesman, taking care of the country, its soldiers, and not an invader, who coveted foreign territories that were very accessible in that situation for the capture.
Source

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the island of Hokkaido (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.

The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril (Khabomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.

The Great Kuril Ridge has a length of 1200 km and extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. The southern islands are forested, while the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.

The Lesser Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.

The Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin Oblast (Russian Federation). They are divided into three districts: North Kuril, Kuril and South Kuril. The centers of these regions have the corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The prevailing heights are 500-1000m. The exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by a low-mountain relief, formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The highest peak of the Kuril Islands is the Alaid volcano -2339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10339 meters. High seismicity is the reason for the constant threat of earthquakes and tsunamis.

The population is 76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because. the main natural wealth is the biological resources of the sea. Agriculture has not received significant development due to unfavorable natural conditions.

Deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements of indium, helium, thallium contained in them are discovered on the Kuril Islands, there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a rather high sulfur content have been discovered.

Transport communications are carried out by sea and air. In winter, regular navigation stops. Due to difficult meteorological conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).

Discovery of the Kuril Islands

In the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639, the “policy of self-isolation” was announced. Under pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Almost no foreign ships were allowed into the ports.” Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuriles by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.

V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, led by Moskvitin, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks left Yakutsk and made the most difficult transition along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya river, to the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk. The first Russian settlements (including Okhotsk) were founded here.”

The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to go along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643, at the end of the summer of 1644, Poyarkov's detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. In early September, the Cossacks saw the Amur Estuary for the first time. From here, the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they got the idea of ​​as a large island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov the "discoverer of Sakhalin", despite the fact that the expedition members did not even visit its shores.

Since then, the Amur has gained great importance, not only as a "bread river", but also as a natural communication. Indeed, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the autumn of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived on the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a large military force.

The development of events steadily led to the fact that the Russian people already in the second half of the 17th century could fully gain a foothold on Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new turn of history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.

Being at war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate the necessary number of people and means to successfully counteract Qing China. Attempts to extract any benefits for Russia through diplomacy have not been successful. In 1689, the Nerchinsk peace was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible to them.

For China, the fact of the "first discovery" of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.

Here, of course, the question arises: why did the Chinese not take advantage of such a favorable situation, did not colonize Primorye, the Amur Region, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878, Chinese women were forbidden to cross the Great Wall of China! And in the absence of "their beautiful half", the Chinese could not firmly settle on these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from the local peoples.

With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk peace, for the Russian people, the sea route remained the most convenient way to Sakhalin. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean becomes regular.

In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky make expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they receive detailed information about most of the Kuriles and about the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin, by order of Peter I, surveyed the northern part of the Great Kuril ridge to the island of Simushir and compiled a detailed map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

In the XVIII century, there was a rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people.

“Thus,” notes V. Shishchenko, “by the middle of the 18th century, an amazing situation had developed. Navigators from different countries literally plowed the ocean far and wide. And the Great Wall, the Japanese "policy of self-isolation" and the inhospitable Sea of ​​Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island beyond the reach of both European and Asian explorers.

At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuriles take place. In the first half of the 18th century, the Kuril Islands were actively developed by Russian people. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and Southern Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing was made on Hokkaido. At that time, the Russian state could not yet take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the natives, which sometimes amounted to robbery and cruelty.

In 1779, by her royal command, Catherine II freed the "hairy smokers" from any fees and forbade encroachment on their territories. The Cossacks could not maintain their power in a non-coercive way, and the islands south of Urup were abandoned by them. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place in order to establish trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to delay time and strengthen their position in the Kuriles and Sakhalin.

In 1798, a major Japanese expedition to Iturup Island took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juzo. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars with the inscription: "Dainihon Erotofu" (Iturup - the possession of Japan) were installed. The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens a sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzo visits Kunashir.

In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they set up their posts and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, the ideas of Europeans about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.

Kuriles in the 19th century

In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian explorers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, and I. F. Kruzenshtern.

Japan's attempts to seize the Kuriles by force provoked protests from the Russian government. N.P., who arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations. Rezanov, told the Japanese that "... to the north of Matsmai (Hokkaido) all lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not extend their possessions further."

However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. At the same time, in addition to the Kuriles, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.

In 1853, the representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.

Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin's mission was to formalize the border between Russia and Japan by treaty.

Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant areas of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan.

After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which established that "the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup", and Sakhalin was declared "undivided" between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup retreated to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.

N.I. Tsimbaev characterizes the state of affairs in the Far East at the end of the 19th century as follows: “Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II determined Russia’s policy in the Far East for a long time, which was cautious and balanced.”

In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for the recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)

The fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Treaty of Shimoda, which proclaimed "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan."

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in the national economic turnover. “A change in the situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, - was associated with the construction of the Siberian railway, the laying of which began in 1891. It was planned to be carried out through the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world."

By the beginning of the XX century. The main hub of international contradictions for Russia has become the Far East and the most important direction - relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not seek it. In 1902 and 1903 there were intensive negotiations between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which did not lead to anything.

On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the Varyag cruiser and the Korean gunboat in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28 Japan declared war on Russia. The treachery of Japan caused a storm of indignation in Russia.

Russia was forced into a war that she did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The causes of general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones were:

• the incompleteness of the military-strategic training of the armed forces;
• significant remoteness of the theater of operations from the main centers of the army and control;
• extremely limited network of communication links.

The hopelessness of the war was clearly manifested by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the fortress of Port Arthur in Russia on December 20, 1904, few believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. The initial patriotic upsurge was replaced by despondency and irritation.

A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of stupor; no one could have imagined that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas II for a long time did not agree to admit the failure in the Far East, believing that these were only temporary setbacks and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike at Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He certainly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, one that only a strong geopolitical position could provide, and it was seriously shaken by military failures.

By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation was possible only in the distant future, and in the short term it was necessary to immediately begin to peacefully resolve the conflict that had arisen. This was forced not only by considerations of a military-strategic nature, but, to an even greater extent, by the complications of the internal situation in Russia.

N.I. Tsimbaev states: "Japan's military victories turned it into the leading Far Eastern power, which was supported by the governments of England and the United States."

The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the absence of previously worked out terms for a possible agreement with Japan.

Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, left for the United States, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation was only instructed not to agree to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to cede “not an inch of Russian land”, although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

Japan initially took a tough stance in Portsmouth, demanding in an ultimatum from Russia a complete withdrawal from Korea and Manchuria, the transfer of the Russian Far Eastern fleet, the payment of indemnities and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.

The negotiations were on the verge of collapse several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation, a positive result was achieved: August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.

In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in South Manchuria, part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov speaks of the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements have become an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. In many ways, they looked like an agreement of equal partners, and not like an agreement concluded after an unsuccessful war.

Thus, after the defeat of Russia, in 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded. The Japanese side demanded from Russia as an indemnity the island of Sakhalin. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the exchange agreement of 1875, and also stated that all trade agreements between Japan and Russia would be canceled as a result of the war.

This treaty annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed as early as the 1920s. Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created - a temporary revolutionary-democratic state, a “buffer” between the RSFSR and Japan. The People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the FER under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, units of the NRA entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the "buffer" republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from which the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR.

By the time the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan was concluded on January 20, 1925, there was in fact no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Peking Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government granted Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular, for the exploitation of 50% of the area of ​​oil fields.

War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference

Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “... a special period of the Great Patriotic War was the war between the USSR and militaristic Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations taken at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan ... During the 24-day military campaign, the millionth Kwantung Army, which was in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army became the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.

It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to the most severe losses for them. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand captured. Japan lost the largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and the most powerful army. Soviet troops expelled the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea, from South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all the military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was not in a position to wage an armed struggle.”

At the Yalta Conference, the “Declaration on a Liberated Europe” was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands that were part of the Japanese “northern territories” (the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Khabomai).

In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan made no territorial claims to the Soviet Union. The advancement of such demands was ruled out then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to comply with all decisions taken by the Allied Powers, including decisions regarding its borders. It was during that period that the new borders of Japan with the USSR were formed.

The transformation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to the changes made to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuriles were included in the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk region of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document that fixed Japan's renunciation of the rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed by it in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.

In the text of this document, summing up the results of the Second World War, in paragraph "C" in Article 2 it was clearly written: "Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Portsmouth Treaty of September 5, 1905.

However, already in the course of the San Francisco Conference, the desire of Japanese government circles to question the legitimacy of the borders established between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism was revealed. At the conference itself, this aspiration did not find open support on the part of its other participants, and above all on the part of the Soviet delegation, which is clear from the above text of the treaty.

Nevertheless, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago under Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Khabomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai actually consists of five small islands adjacent to each other). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of the borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes, and then open support for the aforementioned territorial claims to our country, which the US government circles began to provide Japan with - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.

Such an obvious refusal of the US government circles from their obligations enshrined in the Yalta agreements, according to I.A. Latyshev, explained simply: “... in the face of the further strengthening of the Cold War, in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and the armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to consider Japan as its main military base in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to bind this new ally more firmly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in getting the southern Kuril Islands, although such support represented a US departure from the international agreements mentioned above, designed to secure the borders that had developed as a result of World War II.

The refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty, along with other allied countries participating in the conference, gave the Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union many advantages. This refusal was motivated by Moscow's disagreement with the US intention to use the treaty to maintain American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it was used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union's signature on the peace treaty freed Japan from complying with it.

In subsequent years, the leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry resorted to reasoning in their statements, the essence of which was that since the representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, therefore the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the world community should not give consent to the possession The Soviet Union the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan abandoned these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.

At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the agreement of a mention of who would henceforth own these islands.

Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... Japan's renunciation of the Kuril Islands recorded in the treaty does not mean its renunciation of the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan ... does not consider these islands to be Kuril Islands. And that, when signing the treaty, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuriles, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

However, at the first glance at the Japanese pre-war maps and sailing directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost ones, were one administrative unit, called "Tishima".

I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of a peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very unfortunate political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to contradict the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco Conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other in order to find ways to formally resolve their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as it seemed at first, by both sides at the Soviet-Japanese talks that began in London in June 1955 at the level of ambassadors of both countries.

However, as it turned out during the negotiations that had begun, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the interest of the Soviet Union in normalizing relations with Japan in order to obtain territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was an open refusal of the Japanese government from the San Francisco Peace Treaty in that part of it, where the northern borders of Japan were defined.

From that moment, as I.A. Latyshev, the most ill-fated territorial dispute between the two countries, detrimental to the Soviet-Japanese good neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles embarked on the path of illegal territorial claims to the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders that had developed between both countries as a result of the Second World War.

What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.

One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control of the sea waters surrounding the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest in fish resources, as well as in other seafood, in the Pacific Ocean. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide fabulous profits for Japanese fishing and other companies, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest sea fishing areas for themselves.

Another motivating reason for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuriles under their control was the Japanese understanding of the exceptional strategic importance of the Kuril Islands: whoever owns the islands actually holds in his hands the keys to the gate leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk.

Third, by putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments among broad sections of the Japanese population and use nationalist slogans to rally these sections under their ideological control.

And, finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the ruling circles of Japan to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fit perfectly into the bellicose course of the US government, which was directed at the tip against the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, as well as other influential US political figures, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations, began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.

As for the Soviet side, the advancement of territorial demands by Japan was considered by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders established between the two countries as a result of the Second World War. Therefore, the Japanese demands could not but meet with a rebuff from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years sought to establish good-neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.

The territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956, these negotiations were transferred from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having met a firm rebuff to their claims to South Sakhalin and all the Kuriles, began to quickly moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese was reduced to the demand for the transfer of Japan only the southern Kuriles, namely the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, representing the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.

On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, the short-sightedness in the approach to Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which sought at any cost to accelerate the normalization of relations with Japan, was also revealed. Having no clear idea about the southern Kuriles, and even more so about their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them like small change. This alone can explain the Soviet leader's naive judgment that negotiations with Japan could be successfully completed as soon as the Soviet side made a "small concession" to Japanese demands. In those days, N.S. It seemed to Khrushchev that, imbued with gratitude for the “gentlemanly” gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same “gentlemanly” compliance, namely: it would withdraw its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end with an “amicable agreement” to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet delegation at the negotiations, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede to Japan two southern islands of the Kuril chain: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signs a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Willingly acknowledging this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to stubbornly seek the transfer of all four South Kuril Islands to it. But then she failed to bargain for big concessions.

Khrushchev's irresponsible "gesture of friendship" was recorded in the text of the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations", signed by the heads of government of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “... agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan " .

The future transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the readiness of the Soviet Union to give up part of its territory in the name of good relations with Japan. It was no coincidence, as it was emphasized more than once later, that the article dealt with the "transfer" of these islands to Japan, and not their "return", as the Japanese side was then inclined to interpret the essence of the matter.

The word "transfer" was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede to Japan part of its own, and not Japanese, territory.

However, the inclusion in the declaration of Khrushchev’s reckless promise to give Japan an advance payment of a “gift” in the form of part of the Soviet territory was an example of the political thoughtlessness of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither legal nor moral right to turn the country’s territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The short-sightedness of this promise became obvious within the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy took a course towards strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan's independent role in the Japanese-American "security treaty", the edge of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.

The hopes of the Soviet leadership that its readiness to "transfer" two islands to Japan would induce Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country were not justified either.

The very first months that passed after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.

Soon, Japan had a new "argument" in the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the content of the named declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this "argument" boiled down to the fact that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations did not end, but, on the contrary, implies further negotiations on the "territorial issue" and that the fixation in the ninth article of the declaration of the Soviet Union's readiness to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty still does not draw a line to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, suggests the continuation of this dispute over the other two islands of the southern Kuriles: Kunashir and Iturup.

Moreover, at the end of the 1950s, the Japanese government became more active than before in using the so-called "territorial question" to inflate unkind sentiments towards Russia among the Japanese population.

All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to correct their assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not correspond to the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Shortly after the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the anti-Soviet "security treaty" on January 19, 1960 in Washington, namely on January 27, 1960, the Soviet government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.

The note stated that as a result of the conclusion by Japan of a military treaty weakening the foundations of peace in the Far East, “... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan”; “Agreeing to the transfer of these islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty,” the note continued, “the Soviet government met the wishes of Japan, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peaceful intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.”

As was later pointed out in the cited note, in the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot contribute to the transfer of the Habomai and Shikotan islands belonging to the USSR to Japan to expand the territory used by foreign troops. By foreign troops, the note referred to the US armed forces, whose indefinite presence in the Japanese islands was secured by a new "security treaty" signed by Japan in January 1960.

In the following months of 1960, other notes and statements by the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, testifying to the unwillingness of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations over Japanese territorial claims. Since that time, for a long time, or rather, for more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding the territorial claims of Japan has become extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in relations between the two countries” because this issue has “already been resolved” by previous international agreements.

Japanese claims in 1960-1980

The firm and clear position of the Soviet side with regard to Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60-80s, none of the Japanese statesmen and diplomats managed to draw the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders into any kind of extended discussion about Japanese territorial harassment. .

But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side resigned itself to the Soviet Union's refusal to continue discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of Japanese government circles were aimed at launching the so-called "movement for the return of the northern territories" in the country through various administrative measures.

It is noteworthy that the words "northern territories" acquired a very loose content during the deployment of this "movement".

Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by "northern territories" the four southern islands of the Kuril chain; others, including the socialist and communist parties of Japan, all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of ultra-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.

Beginning in 1969, the Government Cartographic Department and the Ministry of Education began to publicly "correct" maps and textbooks, in which the southern Kuril Islands began to be painted under the color of Japanese territory, as a result of which the territory of Japan "grew" on these new maps, as the press reported. , for 5 thousand square kilometers.

At the same time, more and more efforts were used to process the public opinion of the country and draw as many Japanese as possible into the "movement for the return of the northern territories". So, for example, trips to the island of Hokkaido to the area of ​​the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands are clearly visible, by specialized groups of tourists from other regions of the country, have become widely practiced. The programs of the stay of these groups in the city of Nemuro necessarily included "walks" on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril chain with the aim of "sad contemplation" of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the beginning of the 80s, a significant proportion of the participants in these “nostalgic walks” were schoolchildren, for whom such trips were counted as “study trips” provided for by school programs. On Cape Nosapu, closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, a whole complex of buildings intended for “pilgrims” was built at the expense of the government and a number of public organizations, including a 90-meter observation tower and an “Archival Museum” with a biased exposition designed to convince uninformed visitors in the imaginary historical "validity" of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.

A new moment in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to draw the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made repeatedly.

Since 1980, at the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called "days of the northern territories" have been celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 in the Japanese city of Shimoda that the Russian-Japanese treaty was signed, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands was in the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.

The choice of this date as the "day of the northern territories" was to emphasize that the Shimoda Treaty (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) ostensibly still retains its significance.

Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose its former firmness during M.S.'s tenure. Gorbachev. In public statements, there were calls for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that developed as a result of World War II and for an immediate end to the territorial dispute with Japan through a "fair compromise", which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the lips of the people's deputy, the rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev, who during his stay in Tokyo announced the need to break the Yalta system and transfer the four southern islands of the Kuril chain to Japan as soon as possible.

Following Y. Afanasiev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. Nothing more than a course towards gradual, protracted concessions to Japanese territorial demands was, in particular, the “Program for the Five-Stage Solution of the Territorial Issue”, put forward by the then leader of the interregional group Yeltsin during his visit to Japan in January 1990.

As I.A. Latyshev writes: “The result of long and intense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was a “Joint Statement” signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected Gorbachev's characteristic inconsistency in his views and in protecting the national interests of the state.

On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the "Joint Statement" of any wording openly confirming the readiness of the Soviet side to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. Nor did he agree to refuse the notes of the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.

However, on the other hand, rather ambiguous formulations were nevertheless included in the text of the “Joint Statement”, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor.

Evidence of Gorbachev's inconsistency and unsteadiness in protecting the national interests of the USSR was his statement about the intention of the Soviet leadership to start reducing the ten thousandth military contingent located on the disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen Japanese divisions were stationed. "self-defense forces".

Democratic time of the 90s

The August events of 1991 in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of B. Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal of the three Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya Accords, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening the ability of our country to resist the claims of Japan.

In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin's arrival in Japan was finally agreed - October 11, 1993, the Tokyo press also began to orient the Japanese public to give up excessive hopes for a quick resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia.

The events connected with Yeltsin's further tenure at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the failure of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and the Russian Foreign Ministry leaders for the possibility of quickly resolving the protracted dispute between the two countries through a "compromise" involving the concessions of our country to the Japanese territorial harassment.

Followed in 1994-1999. The discussions between Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, add anything new to the situation that has developed at the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.

In other words, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep impasse in 1994-1999, and neither side saw a way out of this impasse. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to give up its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became, in the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and beyond its walls, even less likely than in previous years.

A clear confirmation of this was the increasing conflicts in the sea waters surrounding the southern Kuriles - conflicts during which, during 1994-1955, the repeated unceremonious incursions of Japanese poachers into the territorial waters of Russia met with a harsh rebuff from Russian border guards who opened fire on violators of the borders.

About the possibilities of settling these relations says I.A. Latyshev: “Firstly, the Russian leadership should have already immediately abandoned the illusion that as soon as Russia cedes the southern Kuriles to Japan, the Japanese side will immediately benefit our country with large investments, soft loans, and scientific and technical information. It was this misconception that prevailed in Yeltsin's entourage.

“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, our diplomats and politicians, both in Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's times, should have abandoned the false judgment that the Japanese leaders could moderate their claims to the southern Kuriles in the short term and make some kind of "reasonable compromise" in the territorial dispute with our country.

For many years, as was discussed above, the Japanese side has never shown, and was unable to show in the future, the desire to abandon its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands. The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demand not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Khabomai and Shikotan), and then, after some time, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).

“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats that the Japanese could be persuaded to conclude a peace treaty with Russia on the basis of the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations” signed in 1956 were self-deception. It was a good deception and nothing more. The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and intelligible confirmation of the obligation recorded in Article 9 of the said declaration to transfer to it, upon the conclusion of a peace treaty, the islands of Shikotan and Habomai. But this did not at all mean that the Japanese side was ready to put an end to its territorial harassment of our country after such confirmation. Japanese diplomats considered the establishment of control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to mastering all four South Kuril Islands.

In the second half of the 1990s, the national interests of Russia demanded that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and vice versa, would inspire the Japanese side with the idea of ​​the inviolability of Russia's post-war borders.

In the fall of 1996, the Russian Foreign Ministry put forward a proposal for "joint economic development" by Russia and Japan of the very four islands of the Kuril archipelago that Japan so insistently claimed was nothing more than another concession to pressure from the Japanese side.

The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the southern Kuril Islands to a certain special zone accessible for business activities of Japanese citizens was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the “justification” of Japanese claims to these islands.

I.A. Latyshev writes: “Another thing is also annoying: in the Russian proposals, which implied wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kuriles, there was not even an attempt to condition this access by Japan's consent to appropriate benefits and free access of Russian entrepreneurs to the territory close to the southern Kuriles areas of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. And this manifested the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve in negotiations with the Japanese side the equality of the two countries in their business activity in each other's territories. In other words, the idea of ​​"joint economic development" of the southern Kuriles turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to master these islands.

The Japanese were allowed to surreptitiously fish in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands that Japan claimed and claims. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant similar rights to Russian fishing vessels to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations for its citizens and vessels to comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in Russian waters.

Thus, decades of attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a "mutually acceptable basis" and sign a bilateral peace treaty between the two countries did not lead to any tangible results. B. Yeltsin's resignation and V.V. Putin alerted the Japanese public.

President of the country V.V. Putin is in fact the only government official authorized by the Constitution to determine the course of Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute between the two countries. His powers were limited by certain articles of the Constitution, and in particular those that obligated the president to “ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory” of the Russian Federation (Article 4), “protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state” (Article 82).

In the late summer of 2002, during his short stay in the Far East, where Putin flew to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the Russian president had only a few words to say about his country's territorial dispute with Japan. At a meeting with journalists held in Vladivostok on August 24, he said that "Japan considers the southern Kuriles its territory, while we consider them our territory."

At the same time, he expressed his disagreement with the disturbing reports of some Russian media that Moscow is ready to "return" the named islands to Japan. “These are just rumors,” he said, “spread by those who would like to get some benefit from it.”

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Moscow took place on January 9, 2003, in accordance with previously reached agreements. However, Putin's talks with Koizumi did not make any progress in the development of the territorial dispute between the two countries. I.A. Latyshev calls the policy of V.V. Putin is indecisive and evasive, and this policy gives the Japanese public a reason to expect a dispute to be resolved in favor of their country.

The main factors to be taken into account when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands:

• the presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;
• underdevelopment of infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the virtual absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of own vehicles to ensure freight and passenger traffic;
• proximity and virtually unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region;
• the need to preserve the unique natural complex of the Kuril Islands, maintain local energy balance while maintaining the purity of the air and water basins, and protect the unique flora and fauna. When developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands, the opinion of the local civilian population should be taken into account. Those who stay should be guaranteed all rights (including property), and those who leave should be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to accept the change in the status of these territories.

The Kuril Islands are of great geopolitical and military-strategic importance for Russia and affect the national security of Russia. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of the Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. In addition, the South Kuriles have a powerful air defense system and radar systems, fuel depots for refueling aircraft. The Kuril Islands and the water area adjacent to them is the only ecosystem of its kind that has the richest natural resources, primarily biological ones.

The coastal waters of the South Kuril Islands and the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitats for valuable commercial fish and seafood species, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the economy of the Kuril Islands.

It should be noted that at the moment Russia and Japan have signed a program for the joint economic development of the South Kuril Islands. The program was signed in Tokyo in 2000 during an official visit to Japan by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands of the Sakhalin region (1994-2005)" in order to ensure the integrated socio-economic development of this region as a special economic zone.

Japan believes that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia is impossible without determining the ownership of the four South Kuril Islands. This was stated by Foreign Minister of this country Yoriko Kawaguchi, speaking to the public of Sapporo with a speech on Russian-Japanese relations. The Japanese threat hanging over the Kuril Islands and their population still worries the Russian people today.

Introduction

Conclusion

Introduction

Political conflicts have always played an important and, undoubtedly, ambiguous role in the global diplomatic community. Particularly noteworthy are disputes over the ownership of territories, especially as long-term as the diplomatic conflict between the Russian Federation and Japan over the ownership of the South Kuril Islands. This is what determines relevance this work.

The course work is written in a simple and understandable language for the general public. It has not only theoretical, but also practical value: the material can be used as a reference in preparation for an exam in history or the basics of the theory of international relations on the topic of Russian-Japanese relations.

So, we have set target:

Analyze the existing problem of belonging to the Kuril Islands and suggest possible solutions to this problem.

The goal determined and specific tasks works:

ñ Collect theoretical material on this topic by analyzing and systematizing information;

ñ Form the positions of each side in the diplomatic conflict;

ñ Draw conclusions.

The work is based on the study of monographs on conflictology and diplomacy, historical sources, news and reportage reviews and notes.

In order to facilitate the perception of incoming information, we divided all the work into three stages.

diplomatic conflict Kuril Island

The first stage consisted in the definition of key theoretical concepts (such as conflict, state border, the right to own territory). He formed the conceptual foundation of this work.

At the second stage, we considered the history of Russian-Japanese relations in the issue of the Kuril Islands; the Russo-Japanese conflict itself, its causes, prerequisites, development. We devoted special attention to the present time: we analyzed the state and development of the conflict at the current stage.

At the final stage, conclusions were drawn.

Chapter I. Essence and concepts of diplomatic conflict in the system of international relations

1.1 Definition of conflict and diplomatic conflict

Humanity has been familiar with conflict since its inception. Disputes and wars broke out throughout the historical development of society between tribes, cities, countries, blocs of states. They were generated by religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic, territorial and other contradictions. As the German military theorist and historian K. von Clausewitz noted, the history of the world is the history of wars. And although such a definition of history suffers from a certain absolutization, there is no doubt that the role and place of conflicts in human history are more than significant. The end of the Cold War in 1989 once again gave rise to rosy predictions about the advent of an era of conflict-free existence on the planet. It seemed that with the disappearance of the confrontation between the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - regional conflicts and the threat of a third world war would sink into oblivion. However, the hopes for a calmer and more comfortable world were once again not destined to come true.

So, from the foregoing, it follows that conflict is the most acute way of resolving contradictions in interests, goals, views, arising in the process of social interaction, consisting in the opposition of the participants in this interaction, and usually accompanied by negative emotions, going beyond the rules and norms. Conflicts are the subject of study of the science of conflictology. Consequently, states that have opposing points of view on the subject of the dispute participate in an international conflict.

When countries try to resolve a conflict diplomatically - that is, without the use of military action - their actions are aimed primarily at finding a compromise at the negotiating table, which can be very difficult. There is an explanation for this: often the leaders of states simply do not want to make concessions to each other - they are satisfied with some semblance of armed neutrality; also, one cannot take into account the causes of the conflict, its history and, in fact, the subject of the dispute. National characteristics and needs play an important role in the development of the conflict - taken together, this can significantly slow down the search for a compromise between the participating countries.

1.2 State border and the right to challenge it by another country

Let's define the state border:

State border - a line and a vertical surface passing along this line, defining the limits of the state territory (land, water, subsoil and air space) of the country, that is, the spatial limit of the state sovereignty.

The following statement indirectly follows from the definition - the state protects its sovereignty, and, consequently, its air and land resources. Historically, one of the most motivating reasons for military action is precisely the division of territories and resources.

1.3 Right to own territories

The question of the legal nature of the state territory presupposes the answer that there is a state territory from a legal point of view, more precisely, that there is a state territory from an international legal point of view.

The state territory is a part of the Earth's surface, lawfully belonging to a certain state, within which it exercises its supremacy. In other words, state sovereignty underlies the legal nature of state territory. Under international law, a territory is linked to its population. The state territory and its population are necessary attributes of the state.

Territorial supremacy means the complete and exclusive power of the state in its territory. This means that the public authority of another power cannot act on the territory of a particular state.

Trends in the development of modern international law indicate that the state is free in the right to use its territorial supremacy to the extent that the rights and legitimate interests of other states are not affected.

The concept of state jurisdiction is narrower in scope than the concept of territorial supremacy. The jurisdiction of the state is understood as the right of its judicial and administrative bodies to consider and resolve any cases within its borders, in contrast to the territorial supremacy, which means the fullness of state power in a certain territory.

Chapter II. Russo-Japanese conflict over the Kuril Islands

2.1 History of the conflict: causes and stages of development

The main problem on the way to reaching an agreement is Japan's territorial claims to the southern Kuril Islands (Iturup Island, Kunashir Island and the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the island of Hokkaido (Japan), which separate the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. Consist of two parallel ridges of islands - Big Kuril and Malaya Kuril 4. The first information about the Kuril Islands was reported by the Russian explorer Vladimir Atlasov.

In 1745, most of the Kuril Islands were marked on the "General Map of the Russian Empire" in the Academic Atlas.

In the 70s. In the 18th century, permanent Russian settlements existed in the Kuriles under the command of the Irkutsk tradesman Vasily Zvezdochetov. On the map of 1809, the Kuriles and Kamchatka were attributed to the Irkutsk province. In the 18th century, the peaceful colonization by Russians of Sakhalin, the Kuriles and the northeast of Hokkaido was largely completed.

In parallel with the development of the Kuriles by Russia, the Japanese were advancing to the Northern Kuriles. Reflecting the Japanese onslaught, in 1795 Russia built a fortified military camp on Urup Island.

By 1804, dual power had actually developed in the Kuriles: the influence of Russia was more strongly felt in the Northern Kuriles, and Japan's influence in the Southern Kuriles. But formally, all the Kuriles still belonged to Russia.

February 1855 was signed the first Russian-Japanese treaty - the Treatise on Trade and Borders. He proclaimed relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, opened three Japanese ports for Russian ships and established a border in the South Kuriles between the islands of Urup and Iturup.

In 1875, Russia signed a Russian-Japanese treaty, according to which it ceded 18 Kuril Islands to Japan. Japan, in turn, recognized the island of Sakhalin as wholly owned by Russia.

From 1875 to 1945 the Kuril Islands were under the control of Japan.

On February 1945, an agreement was signed between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain - Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, according to which, after the end of the war against Japan, the Kuril Islands should be transferred to the Soviet Union.

On September 1945, Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, by which its sovereignty was limited to the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, as well as to the smaller islands of the Japanese archipelago. The islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai went to the Soviet Union.

On February 1946, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kuril Islands Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai were included in the USSR.

On September 1951, at an international conference in San Francisco, a peace treaty was concluded between Japan and 48 countries participating in the anti-fascist coalition, according to which Japan renounced all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. The Soviet delegation did not sign this treaty, referring to the fact that it regards it as a separate agreement between the US and Japanese governments.

From the point of view of treaty law, the question of the ownership of the South Kuriles remained uncertain. The Kuriles ceased to be Japanese, but did not become Soviet. Using this circumstance, Japan in 1955 presented the USSR with claims to all the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin. As a result of two years of negotiations between the USSR and Japan, the positions of the parties drew closer: Japan limited its claims to the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup.

On October 1956, the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan on the termination of the state of war between the two states and the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations was signed in Moscow. In it, in particular, the Soviet government agreed to the transfer of Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan.

After the conclusion of the Japanese-American security treaty in 1960, the USSR canceled the obligations assumed by the declaration of 1956. During the Cold War, Moscow did not recognize the existence of a territorial problem between the two countries. The presence of this problem was first recorded in the Joint Statement of 1991, signed following the visit of the President of the USSR to Tokyo.

In 1993, in Tokyo, the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan signed the Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations, which recorded the agreement of the parties to continue negotiations with the aim of concluding a peace treaty as soon as possible by resolving the issue of ownership of the above-mentioned islands5.

2.2 The development of the conflict at the present time: the positions of the parties and the search for a solution

In recent years, in order to create at the talks an atmosphere conducive to the search for mutually acceptable solutions, the parties have been paying great attention to establishing practical Russian-Japanese interaction and cooperation in the area of ​​the islands. One of the results of this work was the beginning of the implementation in September 1999 of an agreement on the most facilitated procedure for visiting the islands by their former residents from among Japanese citizens and members of their families. Cooperation is being carried out in the fisheries sector on the basis of the current Russian-Japanese Agreement on fishing near the southern Kuriles dated February 21, 1998.

The Japanese side puts forward claims to the southern Kuril Islands, motivating them with references to the Russian-Japanese Treaty on Trade and Borders of 1855, according to which these islands were recognized as Japanese, and also to the fact that these territories are not part of the Kuril Islands, from which Japan refused the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Japan made the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries dependent on the resolution of the territorial dispute.

The position of the Russian side on the issue of border delimitation is that the southern Kuril Islands passed to our country as a result of the Second World War on a legal basis in accordance with the agreements of the allied powers (Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 d.) and Russian sovereignty over them, which has the appropriate international legal design, is not subject to doubt.

Reaffirming its commitment to the previously reached agreements on holding negotiations on a peace treaty, including the issue of border delimitation, the Russian side emphasizes that the solution to this problem should be mutually acceptable, not damage the sovereignty and national interests of Russia, and receive the support of the public and the parliaments of both countries.

Despite all the measures taken, a recent visit by D.A. Medvedev on November 1, 2010, the disputed territory caused an uproar in the Japanese media; Thus, the Japanese government turned to the Russian president with a request to cancel the event in order to avoid aggravating relations between the countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation refused the request. In particular, the message of the diplomatic department noted that "the President of Russia independently determines the routes of travel through the territory of his country," and advice on this matter "from outside" is inappropriate and unacceptable7 .

At the same time, the deterrent effect of the unresolved territorial problem on the development of Russian-Japanese relations has significantly decreased. This is primarily due to the strengthening of Russia's international positions and understanding in Tokyo of the need to develop Russian-Japanese relations, including trade and economic cooperation, against the backdrop of the progressive growth of the Russian economy and the increasing investment attractiveness of the Russian market.

Conclusion

The problem remains a problem. Russia and Japan have been living without any peace treaty since the Second World War - this is unacceptable from a diplomatic point of view. Moreover, normal trade and economic relations and political interaction are possible if the issue of the Kuril Islands is fully resolved. The final point, perhaps, will help to put a vote among the population of the disputed Kuril Islands, because first of all, you need to listen to the opinion of the people.

The only key to mutual understanding between the two countries is the creation of a climate of trust, trust and again trust, as well as broad mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of politics, economics and culture. To reduce the distrust accumulated over the centuries to zero and start moving towards trust with a plus is the key to the success of a peaceful neighborhood and tranquility in the border sea areas of Russia and Japan. Will current politicians be able to realize this opportunity? Will show time.

List of sources used

1.Azrilyan A. Legal Dictionary. - M.: Institute of New Economics, 2009 - 1152 p.

2.Antsupov A.Ya., Shipilov A.I. Meaning, subject and tasks of conflictology. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2008 - 496 p.

.Biryukov P.N. International law. - M.: Jurist, 2008 - 688 p.

.Zuev M.N. Russian history. - M.: Yurayt, 2011 - 656 p.

.Klyuchnikov Yu.V., Sabanin A. International politics of modern times in contracts, notes and declarations. Part 2. - M.: Reprint edition, 1925 - 415 p.

.Turovsky R.F. political regionalism. - M.: GUVSHE, 2006 - 792 p.

7.http://www.bbc. co. UK

Tutoring

Need help learning a topic?

Our experts will advise or provide tutoring services on topics of interest to you.
Submit an application indicating the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.

Relations between Russia and Japan have intensified to such an extent that they have not been in all 60 years since the restoration of diplomatic ties between the countries. The leaders of both countries constantly meet, discussing something. What exactly?

It is publicly stated that joint economic projects are the subject of discussion, but a number of experts believe otherwise: the real reason for the meetings is the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands, which is being resolved by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. And then there's the Nikkei newspaper published information that Moscow and Tokyo seem to be planning to introduce joint management of the northern territories. So what - the Kuriles are preparing to transfer to Japan?

The thaw in relations became especially noticeable six months ago, during Shinzo Abe's May visit to Sochi. Then the Japanese prime minister called the Russian president “you”, explaining that in Japan they only address a friend in this way. Another sign of friendship was Tokyo's refusal to join the economic sanctions against Russia.

Abe proposed to Putin an eight-point economic cooperation plan in various areas - industry, energy, the gas sector, and trade partnerships. In addition, Japan is ready to invest in Russian healthcare and transport infrastructure. In general, a dream, not a plan! What about in return? Yes, the painful topic of the Kuril Islands was also touched upon. The parties agreed that the solution of the territorial dispute is an important step towards the signing of a peace treaty between the countries. That is, there were no hints about the transfer of the islands. Nevertheless, the first stone in the development of a sensitive topic was laid.

Danger of angering the dragon

Since then, the leaders of Russia and Japan have met on the sidelines of international summits.

In September, during the Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Abe again promised economic cooperation, but this time he directly addressed Putin with a call for joint efforts to solve the problem of the northern territories, which has been overshadowing Russian-Japanese relations for several decades.

In the meantime, the Nikkei newspaper reported that Tokyo expects to establish joint control over the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, while hoping to get Habomai and Shikotan in full in the future. The publication writes that Shinzo Abe should discuss this issue with Vladimir Putin during their meeting scheduled for December 15.

Nihon Kezai also wrote about the same: the Japanese government is discussing a project of joint governance with Russia as a measure that will help move the territorial problem off the ground. The publication even reports: there is information that Moscow has begun the process of setting goals.

And then came the poll results. It turns out that already more than half of the Japanese "are ready to show flexibility in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands." That is, they agree that Russia not hand over four disputed islands, but only two - Shikotan and Habomai.

Now the Japanese press is writing about the transfer of the islands as a practically resolved issue. It is unlikely that information on such an important topic is sucked from the finger. The main question remains: is Moscow really ready to give up territories in exchange for economic cooperation with Japan and its help in the fight against sanctions?

Obviously, with all the goodness of Putin’s communication with Abe, it is hard to believe that the President of the Russian Federation, after the annexation of Crimea, earned himself the fame of a “collector of Russian lands”, will agree to a soft and gradual, but still loss of territories. Especially on the nose of the 2018 presidential election. But what will happen after them?

The Russian Public Opinion Research Center last conducted a survey on the transfer of the Kuril Islands in 2010. Then the vast majority of Russians - 79% - were in favor of leaving the islands to Russia and stop discussing this issue. It is unlikely that public sentiment has changed much over the past six years. If Putin really wants to go down in history, he is unlikely to be pleasantly associated with unpopular politicians who have already attempted to transfer the islands.

However, they transferred the lands to China, and nothing - the public was silent.

On the other hand, the Kuriles are a symbol, which is why they are well-known. But if you want an explanation, you can find anything. Moreover, there are arguments for mass consumption. Thus, the Tokyo correspondent of TASS Vasily Golovnin writes: as compensation for the transfer of the South Kuril Islands, Japan promises to establish a post office and hospitals in Russia, equipping clinics with equipment for early diagnosis of diseases at its own expense. In addition, the Japanese intend to offer their developments in the field of clean energy, housing construction, as well as year-round growing vegetables. So there will be something to justify the transfer of a couple of islands.

Moscow's friendship with Tokyo alarms Beijing

However, this issue has another side. The fact is that Japan has territorial claims not only to Russia, but also to China and South Korea. In particular, there is a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Beijing over the status of an uninhabited piece of land called Okinotori. According to the Japanese version, this is an island, but China considers it rocks, which means it does not recognize Tokyo's international law to establish a 200-mile exclusive economic zone around it. The subject of another territorial dispute is the Senkaku archipelago in the East China Sea, 170 kilometers northeast of Taiwan. Japan is arguing with South Korea over the ownership of the Liancourt Islands, located in the western part of the Sea of ​​Japan.

Therefore, if Russia satisfies the territorial claims of Japan, there will be a precedent. And then Tokyo will begin to seek similar actions from its other neighbors. It is logical to assume that these neighbors will regard the transfer of the Kuril Islands as a "setup." Should we quarrel with China, our main strategic partner in Asia? Especially now, when the construction of the second branch of the Russian gas pipeline to China has begun, when the Chinese are investing in our gas companies. Of course, policy diversification in Asia is a useful thing, but one that requires the Kremlin to be very careful.

How the Kuriles tried to return to Japan

Nikita Khrushchev, when he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, offered to return to Japan two islands that lie closest to its borders. The Japanese side ratified the treaty, but Moscow changed its mind due to the increased US military presence in Japan.

The next attempt was made by the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev was already preparing documents for the visit of the head of state to Japan, during which it was supposed to formalize the transfer of the islands. What prevented Yeltsin's plans? There are different versions of this. Major General of the FSO in the reserve Boris Ratnikov, who from 1991 to 1994 worked as the first deputy head of the Main Security Directorate of the Russian Federation, said in an interview how his department upset Yeltsin's visit to Japan, allegedly for security reasons. According to another version, Anatoly Chubais dissuaded Yeltsin, actually embodying a scene from the film "Ivan Vasilyevich Changes His Profession", where the thief Miloslavsky throws himself at the feet of the false tsar with the words: "They did not order to execute, they told to say the word."